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Property Disputes Between Husband and Wife in Pennsylvania
Disputes between spouses concerning property can be traced far back
in our law. In fact, it probably is a part of one of the oldest branches of
known law. Although the problems arising from such disputes are not
momentous or world-shaking in nature, they occur every day; they are
the ones that the practitioner meets in his daily practice.
In these disputes, the parties are nearly always at arm's length, for it
is notorious that where family relations fall out and the matter ends up
in a court of law, the quarrel is generally more embittered than that which
arises between litigants who are comparative strangers to each other. In
such family situations, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to effect a
compromise.
At common law, solutions to these problems were obtained with com-
parative ease because the husband was the master of the household in law
and in fact. Hence the rationalization that all property of the family
belonged to the husband was not a difficult one to accept. As the years
went by, the family situation changed to give the wife more responsibilities
and the common law dogma became less tenable. This was recognized by
judicial decisions and by sporadic legislative enactments which gave mar-
ried women more rights. This evolution has produced equitable results
in certain fields, but in a few instances the rights of spouses have become
confused and distorted. For the law had not completely kept pace with
our current social philosophy that husband and wife are generally con-
sidered equals.1
It is the purpose of this Note to trace the growth of various phases
of family property law. Because the area is extensive, the discussion will
be restricted to: (1) separation agreements between the spouses; (2)
tenancy by the entireties; (3) property rights of the respective spouses;
(4) and the effect of divorce on property owned by the spouses.
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS BETWEEN SPOUSES
Due to the inferior status attributed to married women at common
law, no contract could be made between a husband and wife without the
intervention of a trustee. Gradual relaxations were made by courts of
equity in this area of law to prevent injustices. Particularly, equity would
uphold the contract when it was reasonable and had been executed.2 Legis-
lative adoption of these holdings and various extensions were reflected in
1. ". . . legislative policy has been unquestionably in the direction of granting
women equal rights with men in respect to their property." Hasldns, The Estate By
the Marital Right, 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 345, 353 (1949).
2. Hutton v. Hutton's Adm'r, 3 Pa. 100 (1846).
(498)
the Act of June 8, 1893, 3 whereby agreements between spouses were taken
out of the realm of equity jurisdiction and became enforceable through
proceedings at law.4 By far, the most important of these contracts, and
perhaps the ones which caused more litigation, were those entered into
between husband and wife covering separation agreements. For when the
unity of marriage is threatened, many spouses for the first time focus
their attention on their individual property rights and try to devise methods
of protecting them.
Valid Separation Agreements.-The law favors family settlements,
especially if they are made in good faith and their prime objective is to
settle an existing controversy between husband and wife.5 Agreements
for support of one who has withdrawn from the house and family, based
upon a good consideration and reasonable in terms, are valid. 6 As long
as there is no fraud or overreaching, the separation itself is ample con-
sideration for the agreement which evidences it.7 Such agreements may
be properly entered into to facilitate a disposition of the property between
the spouses, or executed in consideration of the withdrawal of a proceeding
for desertion or nonsupport."
Further, if there was a valid separation agreement whereby the wife
received a lump sum payment and the testimony reveals that the wife
knew that was all she would ever get, she will be barred from claiming at
the death of her husband any portion of his estate. 9 Likewise, where a
wife by such an agreement released her husband "from all duties, liabilities
and obligations of every kind whatsoever, which otherwise she might or
could claim under or by virtue of the marriage relation," she is not per-
mitted to claim any share of her husband's estate under the intestate laws.' 0
But, the wife may recover from the estate where the court finds an intent
to provide for her after her husband's death. 1
In reviewing these arrangements, courts are particularly alert to de-
termine and scrutinize all circumstances surrounding the promulgation of
the agreements. If their primary purpose is to contravene some phase of
public policy, the judiciary, without hesitation, will declare them invalid.
Invalid Separation Agreements.-If the contract has for its sole pur-
pose the securing of a divorce, the agreement will be held contrary to public
3. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 48, § 31 et seq. (Purdon, 1930); See also PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 48, § 31 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1949).
4. Miller v. Miller, 284 Pa. 414, 131 Atl. 236 (1925).
5. Fishblate v. Fishblate, 238 Pa. 450, 86 Atl. 469 (1913).
6. Singer's Estate, 233 Pa. 55, 81 AUt. 898 (1911) ; Scott's Estate (No. 2), 147
Pa. 102, 23 Atl. 214 (1892); Hitner's Appeal, 54 Pa. 110 (1867); Hutton v. Hut-
ton's Adm'r, 3 Pa. 100 (1846); Forbes v. Forbes, 159 Pa. Super. 243, 48 A.2d
153 (1946).
7. Huffman v. Huffman, 311 Pa. 123, 166 Atl. 570 (1933).
8. Miller v. Miller, 284 Pa. 414, 131 Atl. 236 (1925).
9. Frank's Appeal, 195 Pa. 26, 45 AUt. 489 (1900).
10. Scott's Estate (No. 2), 147 Pa. 102, 23 Atl. 214 (1892).
11. Huffman v. Huffman, 311 Pa. 123, 166 Atl. 570 (1933).
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policy, and therefore, inoperative. 12 The theory behind this is that mar-
riage is not merely a civil contract; it is also an institution sanctioned,
encouraged and enforced by the State. Hence, the parties cannot at their
mutual whim rescind or dissolve it as they may all other contracts. In
this sphere the State, through its duly authorized assembly, has named
the reasons for which the marriage can be dissolved. Thus, there can be
no decree pro confesso upon a libel for divorce; and further, no divorce
will be granted where there is "levity or collusion." Therefore, every
contract founded upon a consideration which in effect is in contravention
of the legal causes for divorce will be held illegal and void.'3
An arrangement tending to facilitate the granting of a decree is also
invalid. An example of this would be a contract between a husband and
wife pending proceedings in divorce by which the wife would be paid
money, in consideration of her agreement not to oppose the divorce in
any manner.14  However, if the facts negative such an understanding, a
settlement for support will be upheld, though a divorce was in the minds
of the parties,' 5 or the causes upon which the divorce was to be obtained
were limited by the agreement.16 But apparently parol evidence cannot
be introduced to show that an agreement, valid on its face, had as its
primary purpose the securing of a divorce.17 This evidences a further
inclination by the courts to uphold separation agreements.
Termination of Agreements by Acts of the Parties.-An argeement of
separation may be annulled by a reconciliation and a resumption by hus-
band and wife of the marital relation. However, whether such an annulment
is effected is dependent upon the intent of the parties, which is determined
from their statements, conduct and all the surrounding circumstances.' 8
The reconciliation may be made in pursuance of an agreement which rati-
fies their previous separation agreement, except the stipulation that the
parties live apart. Where the parties enter into this new agreement with
no fraud, overreaching or unfairness, and one spouse complies with his
covenant, equity will compel specific performance by the other spouse of
his property obligations incorporated in the agreement.' 9
TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES
Except for a few American jurisdictions which by statute or other-
wise have abandoned the common law, tenancies or estates by the entireties
12. American National Bank of Camden, Adm'r. v. Kirk, 317 Pa. 551, 177 Atl.
801 (1935).
13. Kilborn v. Field, 78 Pa. 194 (1875).
14. Mathiot's Estate, 243 Pa. 375, 90 Atl. 139 (1914).
15. Forbes v. Forbes, 159 Pa. Super. 243, 48 A.2d 153 (1946); Schofield v.
Schofield, 124 Pa. Super. 469, 181 Atl. 572 (1937).
16. Schmoker v. Schmoker, 359 Pa. 272, 59 A.2d 55 (1948) (stipulated in agree-
ment that grounds for divorce alleged would be anything except adultery); Irvin
v. Irvin, 169 Pa. 529, 32 Atl. 445 (1895) (agreement that if divorce was sought it
would be on ground of desertion).
17. Miller v. Miller, 284 Pa. 414, 131 Atl. 236 (1925).
18. Zlotziver v. Zlotziver, 355 Pa. 299, 49 A.2d 779 (1946).
19. Singer's Estate, 233 Pa. 55, 81 Atl. 898 (1911).
are universally recognized as a traditional method by which married per-
sons can hold property.20 There are five unities requisite for this type of
estate-those of interest, title, time, possession and the unity of the hus-
band and wife as a person at law. The basis of the estate is the common
law conception of the indivisibility of husband and wife under the marital
relationship. As Bracton said, "Man and wife are as one person, for they
are one in flesh and blood." 21
Conveyances to Husband and Wife.-At common law a conveyance
to husband and wife was presumed to create an estate by the entireties.2'
Cases decided since the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts,
which substantially recognized the wife to be the husband's equal by allow-
ing a wife to hold property separate from her husband, have held that a
conveyance to husband and wife granting distinct undivided interests or
individual estates to each, will not be construed to create an estate by the
entireties as against the express intent of the parties that they shall take
otherwise. 23 Hence, a husband and wife may take and hold property as
tenants in common, i.e., as individuals and not as a common law entity,
if that be the actual intent. But if the deed to husband and wife discloses
no such intention, they will still take as tenants by the entireties.
24
Transfer between spouses of real property.-At common law a wife,
who was the sole owner of real property could not convey it to her hus-
band and herself so as to create a tenancy by the entirety without the inter-
vention of a trustee. The reason for this was that a grant or transfer of
an interest in land had to be between separate and distinct grantors and
grantees.2 5 Judicial interpretation of The Uniform Interparty Agreement
Act, enacted in 1927,26 changed the common law rule, and allowed a
married woman to convey her real estate directly to her husband and
herself in the same manner that she can convey it to any other person to
hold jointly with her.2 7  Later the Act was amended so as to incorporate
the judicial holding.
28
20. For a discussion of estates by the entireties see Fairchild v. Chastelleux, 1
Pa. 176 (1845); Johnson v. Hart, 6 W. & S. 319 (Pa. 1843). See also Doe v.
Parratt, [1794] 5 T.R. 652, 654, 101 Eng. Rep. 363; Back v. Andrews, [1689] 2
Eq. Cas. Abr. 230, 2 Vern. 120, 24 Eng. Rep. 1; 2 KE:NT CoMM. *132; 2 BL. CoMM.
*182.
21. Co. LiTr. *291. As to this statement, Professor Haskins has said such an
explanation is deceptive and historically incorrect. Haskins, The Estate By The
Marital Right, 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 345, 346 (1949).
22. See Bramberry's Estate, 156 Pa. 628, 632, 27 Atl. 405, 408 (1893).
23. Blease v. Anderson, 241 Pa. 198, 88 At. 365 (1913); Young's Estate, 166
Pa. 645, 31 Atl. 373 (1895).
24. Klenke's Estate (No. 1), 210 Pa. 572, 6 Atl. 166 (1905) (personalty);
In re Estate of Mary R. Vandergrift, 105 Pa. Super. 293, 161 Atl. 898 (1932)
(realty).
25. In re Estate of Mary R. Vandergrift, 105 Pa. Super. 293, 161 Atl. 898
(1932).
26. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 541 (Purdon, 1931).
27. In re Estate of Mary P_ Vandergrift, 105 Pa. Super. 293, 161 Atl. 898
(1932).
28. PA. STAT. ANN., fit. 69, § 541 (Purdon Supp. 1949). See also PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 48, § 71 (Purdon Supp. 1949) (reaches same result).
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Interests of spouses in real property held by the entirety.-Before the
passage of the various statutes relating to the property of a married
woman, a husband who held with his wife an estate by the entirety had
substantial control over it and its income. He was entitled to all of the
rents and profits derived therefrom. Further, he could sell it and the
purchaser would receive an estate for the life of the husband and an absolute
estate in remainder, if the husband survived his wife. If waste was com-
mitted, the husband could sue in his own name and for his sole benefit,
even though the injury would result in a detriment to the wife's interest,
if she survived her spouse. 29 It should be noted that these rights were not
an incident of the estate but of the husband's marital rights and applied
to the property of the wife, regardless of the type of her estate in it.30
Though the Married Women's Property Acts effectively abolished these
marital rights, they did not affect the existence of the estate by the en-
tireties.3 ' Today, neither husband nor wife can sell any interest, including
the expectancy of survivorship, without the joinder of other. Further,
the husband no longer has sole interest in the rents and profits, and the
wife is an equal partner with her husband in this type of estate.
3 2
Personal Property and Choses in Action of the Spouses.-Personal
property may be held by husband and wife by the entireties,3 as well as
choses in action which are in possession. 34  Where a bank deposit is pay-
able to "husband and wife"-a deposit by the entireties-the money can
not be withdrawn except upon checks or orders signed by both spouses,
and the bank could pay differently only at its peril. 5 But there is nothing
in the law relating to entireties that would prevent one spouse from giving
the other spouse express authority to sign for her or him as agent and
withdraw for both of them, although no such authority may be implied.
8 6
Consequently, when an account is made payable at its creation to "husband
or wife," there is an immediate expression of authority for either one to
act for both.
37
29. See O'Malley v. O'Malley, 272 Pa. 528, 532, 116 Atl. 500, 502 (1922).
30. Fairchild v. Chastelleux, 1 Pa. 176 (1845).
31. Meyer's Estate (No. 1), 232 Pa. 89, 81 Atl. 145 (1911).
32. Gasner v. Pierce, 286 Pa. 529, 134 At. 494 (1926); O'Malley v. O'Malley,
272 Pa. 528, 116 At. 500 (1922).
33. E.g., Wilbur Trust Co. v. Knadler, 322 Pa. 17, 185 A.2d 319 (1936) (mort-
gage trust certificates) ; Sloan's Estate, 254 Pa. 346, 98 Atl. 966 (1916) (joint bank
account) ; Parry's Estate, 188 Pa. 33, 41 Atl. 448 (1898) (letters of credit pur-
chased by the husband in the name of himself and his wife); Gillan's Executors
v. Dixon, 65 Pa. 395 (1870) (personal estate of a deceased daughter passing to her
parents); Magee v. Morton Building & Loan Assn., 103 Pa. Super. 331, 158 At.
647 (1932) (building and loan stock).
34. Klenke's Estate (No. 1), 210 Pa. 572, 6 Atl. 166 (1905); Bramberry's
Estate, 156 Pa. 628, 27 Atl. 405 (1893).
35. Milano v. Fayette Title & Trust Co., 96 Pa. Super. 310 (1929).
36. Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings & Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 200 Atl. 624 (1938).
37. E.g., Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings & Trust Co., supra note 36. In Gasner
v. Pierce, 286 Pa. 529, 134 Atl. 494 (1926) the premises were held by the entireties.
Lessee signed a lease of said premises, but only lessor husband signed. The court
held the wife could collect the rent and once this was done the husband could not
claim the same rent from the lessee; O'Malley v. O'Malley, 272 Pa. 528, 116 Atl.
500 (1922) (to same effect).
Accounting Between Spouses re Property Held by the Entireties.-
At common law a wife could not maintain an action against her husband
to enforce a property right; the legal unity of marriage prevented such
action.38 The Act of June 8, 1893, as amended, provides inter alia: that
a married women "may not sue her husband, except in a proceeding for
divorce, or in a proceeding to protect and recover her separate property;
nor may he sue her, except in a proceeding for divorce, or in a proceeding
to protect or recover his separate property." 39 (Italics supplied.) In an
estate by the entireties the property belongs to both and is not considered
the separate property of either the husband or the wife individually-the
title is said to be per tout et non per my. 40 The problem then raised is-
suppose one spouse takes the entire profits from the property held by
entireties what may the spouse deprived of the profits do?
It was early held in Meyer's Estate,41 that since there was no separate
property of either spouse, neither party could maintain an action against
the other for an accounting of funds derived from property so held. In
fact, neither of the spouses could restrain the other against consuming
more than an equal part.
This broad prohibition was relaxed somewhat in the case of O'Malley
v. O'Malley,42 which involved an accounting between the parties after they
were divorced. In Pennsylvania a divorce at that time did not terminate
the estate by the entireties, 43 but nevertheless, an accounting was allowed
in this situation.44 The court approved the Meyer's doctrine but stated
that it only applied to the particular facts of that case, i.e., when a trustee
in bankruptcy of the husband claims one-half of property held by the
entireties, and the parties are married and living together.
Further inroads into the general rule that a spouse may not maintain
an action for an accounting of property held by the entireties were made
by the court in the case of Berhalter v. Berhalter.45 There an accounting
was allowed when a wife withdrew all funds held by the entireties and
threatened to leave her husband. The court stated that a tenancy by the
entirety could be terminated by agreement between the parties. Here,
although either spouse had the right to withdraw the funds from the bank,
the wife's withdrawal under these circumstances amounted to an offer to
terminate the estate. The husband's suit for an accounting constituted
the necessary acceptance. Then the estate no longer existed and the hus-
band could sue for his separate property. It was noted that where such
a joint power of withdrawal exists, it must be exercised in good faith for
38. See Heckman v. Heckman, 215 Pa. 203. 205, 64 Atl. 425, 426 (1906).
39. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 48, § 111 (Purdon, 1930).
40. Frederick, Adm'r v. Southwick, 165 Pa. Super. 78, 67 A.2d 802 (1949).
41. 232 Pa. 89, 81 Atl. 145 (1911).
42. 272 Pa. 528, 116 Atl. 500 (1922).
43. See text infra at note 143.
44. But cf. Milano v. Fayette Title and Trust Co., 96 Pa. Super. 310 (1929),
the court there distinguished the O'Malley case from the Meyer's case in that
O'Malley involved only income and there can be an accounting for that, but in the
Meyer's case it was corpus and there can be no accounting in that situation.
45. 315 Pa. 225, 173 Atl. 172 (1934).
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the mutual benefit of both spouses; here one spouse converted against the
other's will and without the other's consent, thereby expressly or by impli-
cation denying the other's estate in the property.
This view was further explained in the case of Werle v. Werle.
46
There all funds in a checking account made payable to either husband or
wife were supplied by the husband. Subsequently, he withdrew the
funds, alleging an oral understanding that, despite the form of the ac-
counts, the funds were to remain his. This contention was discredited,
and the account was held to be a tenancy by the entirety. Consequently,
the husband's withdrawal under the claim of full ownership amounted to a
fictitional offer to sever the estate and the wife's request for an accounting
was a sufficient acceptance.
Then came the decision of Wakefield v. Wakefield,47 where a wife
sought an accounting from her husband of rents which accrued after sepa-
ration from real estate held by the entirety. There was no allegation of
an intent to defraud, or that the husband was using the funds for his own
selfish use. Thus, the reasons for allowing an accounting in the Berhalter
and Werle cases did not exist. No offer to destroy the estate and divide
the property could be inferred from the alleged conduct of the husband;
the property was still held by the entireties and therefore no accounting
could be obtained.
48
After the appellate courts had developed this reasonable test for de-
termining when to allow one spouse to obtain an accounting for property
held by the entirety, a lower court apparently relaxed somewhat the dis-
tinctions developed. 49 It granted a wife one-half of the funds that were
in a joint bank account before her husband transferred the entire funds
to his sole account. Apparently the only evidence of the husband's fraud-
ulent intent was his prior refusal to comply with the wife's demands for
one-half of the funds. Nevertheless, the court considered his acts sufficient
to constitute bad faith. Therefore, the wife's demands were justified.50
In a recent case, where the only evidence before the Superior Court
was that one spouse had taken all funds held by the entirety, the court
refused to allow an accounting.5 ' It reiterated the accepted dogma that
either spouse may withdraw the funds in such a bank account, where the
right has been reserved, but the power must be exercised in good faith for
the mutual benefit of both.
46. 332 Pa. 49, 1 A.2d 244 (1938).
47. 149 Pa. Super. 9, 25 A.2d 841 (1942).
48. It is interesting to note that in Weiner v. Weiner, 68 D. & C. 51 (Pa. C.P.
1949), the court asserted that the Supreme Court (Berhalter Case) is following a
liberal trend in allowing during the continuation of the marriage an accounting of
property held by the spouses as tenants by the entireties, while the Superior Court
(Wakefield case) is adhering to the original strict theory in refusing an accounting
between tenants by the entireties while the marriage subsists. This distinction ap-
pears fallacious because the court did not give proper weight to the distinguishing
facts in the cases.
49. Gontek v. Gontek, 58 D. & C. 419 (Pa. C.P. 1947).
50. See Werle v. Werle, 332 Pa. 49, 1 A.2d 244 (1938).
51. Kaufman v. Kaufman, 166 Pa. Super. 6, 70 A.2d 481 (1950).
The above rule appears to be followed by the various county courts.
52
However, at times they are urged to overthrow the doctrine and require
spouses to obtain an absolute divorce before either may bring a suit for
an accounting. To support this view, its proponents point to the present
statutes which provide that non-divorced spouses may only sue each other
for their separate property. Since property held by the entireties does not
fall within this classification, they contend that the current judicial holdings
are beyond the statute. They further urge that there is no legitimate
reason to allow the relationship of marriage to continue, while at the same
time decreeing the parties to be in the position of defrauder and victim.
Thus, their position is that the statutes, contract of marriage, and unities
of the estate should make the parties immune to litigation concerning petty
differences over property held by the entirety; and if the differences are
not petty, the marriage should be dissolved.58
Justification for the above view appears extremely tenuous when cog-
nizance is taken of the situation existing in many households today.
Numerous factors often deter spouses from seeking a divorce, although
the marital relationship may exist in name only. This unhealthy situation
often results from a desire by the spouses to shield their children from the
social disgrace accompanying divorce. Also, religious beliefs or other
deeply imbedded feelings may deter them from obtaining a legal termina-
tion of their marriage. It is under these conditions that extreme injustice
and hardship could result if one spouse is precluded from maintaining a
legal action to prevent the other from completely usurping property held
by the entirety. Obviously, the situation is pathological and represents a
lag in our legislative enactments. Courts have struggled with difficult
statutory language and deeply rooted tradition to reach equitable results;
immediate assistance from the legislature should be forthcoming.
Rights of Creditors re Property Held by the Entireties.-If property
is lawfully held by the husband and wife as tenants by te entireties it can
not be reached by the creditors of either of the spouses. 54 This is on the
theory that the property is owned by the unity of husband and wife and
not by either individually. Therefore, neither has an interest which his or
her creditors can reach. However, the expectant interest of either the hus-
band or the wife can be the subject of a lien. But if the interest is sold
by the joint parties, the lien can not be enforced against it. For the lien
to be enforceable it must be against the surviving spouse, because it is only
52. E.g., Scardino v. Scardino, 69 D. & C. 635 (Pa. C. P. 1949) in which hus-
band told lawyer, who received interest on a mortgage owned by the husband and
wife as tenants by the entireties, not to pay over any portion thereof to the wife.
The court held there could be no accounting, since this did not constitute an offer
on the part of the husband to destroy the estate, which the wife may accept, but on
the contrary tends to preserve the fund in its entirety, by refusing to allow it to
be divided. Lalich v. Lalich, 60 D. & C. 337 (Pa. C. P. 1947) (where husband
filed bill for accounting for one half of profits of a lunchroom owned by spouses as
tenants by the entireties, court held no accounting on basis of Wakefield case).
53. Weiner v. Weiner, 68 D. & C. 51 (Pa. C.P. 1949).
54. Iscovitz v. Filderman, 334 Pa. 585, 6 A.2d 270 (1939).
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at that time that the spouse becomes the sole and indefeasible owner of the
legal title.55
Persons Not Legally Husband and Wife.-An estate in entirety may
be acquired only by a man and women who acquire the legal relation of
husband and wife at the time the conveyance or devise to them became
effective.5" Parties not being husband and wife can not take title as
tenants by the entireties for such seisin per tout et non per my is restricted
to grantees who are legally husband and wife.57 Thus, there is no tenancy
by the entireties where an estate is conveyed to a man and woman who
are unmarried in law, and who afterwards marry; as they took originally
by moieties, they continue to hold by the moieties after marriage. 58 The
fact, however, that the deed was ineffective in creating a tenancy by the
entireties, does not in itself invalidate it, the grantees have still been
allowed to take an estate, either as joint tenants or tenants in common.5 9
What particular estate the grantees take depends upon the form of dual
ownership that would be "appropriate under the circumstances." 60 To
determine the "appropriate" form of joint ownership, the court will con-
sider-"Did the parties manifest an intention to create an estate to be
owned completely by the surviving grantee ?" 61
Thus in situations where the parties enter into a bigamous marriage
(normally because one of the parties believes his previous spouse to be
dead) and have property deeded or devised to them, "their heirs and
assigns as tenants by the entireties," their declared intention is considered
to be to own an estate per tout et non per my. This was the reasoning of
Maxwell v. Saylor 62 which held that the instrument stated in so many
words that the spouses desired to establish a right of survivorship. The
court explained that under such circumstances a joint tenancy with the
right of survivorship, an estate per my et per tout, best effectuates the
declared intention to the extent legally allowed. This form of joint owner-
ship for unmarried persons most closely approximates a tenancy by the
entireties enjoyed by lawfully married parties, since in both situations the
survivor takes the whole.
55. Klopenstein v. Chadbourne, 105 Pa. Super. 530, 161 Atl. 624 (1932).
56. Barrows v. Romaine, 17 D. & C. 457 (Pa. C.P. 1931).
57. Frederick, Adm'r. v. Southwick, 165 Pa. Super. 78, 67 A.2d 802 (1949);
Thornton v. Pierce, 328 Pa. 11, 194 AtI. 897 (1937).
58. Stuckey v. Keefe's Executor's, 26 Pa. 397, 403 (1856).
59. Thornton v. Pierce, 328 Pa. 11, 194 Atl, 897 (1937) cites no Pennsylvania
authority for this proposition, although cases in other jurisdictions are cited; Debnam
v. Debnam, 63 D. & C. 700 (Pa. C.P. 1948).
60. Maxwell v. Saylor, 359 Pa. 94, 58 A.2d 355 (1948); See Teacher v.
Kijurina, 76 A.2d 197, 201 (Pa. 1950).
61. Frederick, Adm'r. v. Southwick, 165 Pa. Super. 78, 67 A.2d 802 (1949).
62. 359 Pa. 94, 58 A.2d 355 (1948). The dissent was vigorous in saying
there could be no joint tenancy, but what resulted was tenancy in common. This
is the most that parties not legally husband and wife take when they try to create
a tenancy by the entirety. The minority claim there is no support for the position
taken by the majority.
This rule was modified to some extent by the recent case of Teacher
v. Kijurina.6 There the named grantees lived together but were not in
fact married. It was held a tenancy in common without the right of sur-
vivorship was created when land was conveyed to them as "Nick Kijurina
and Sarah his wife." The court said, "In Maxwell v. Saylor we went
as far as we could go and that case must not be extended beyond its facts."
However, even where the court claims it is carrying out the intention
of the parties, there is a technical difference between the estate the parties
tried to take and the estate they were given by the court.6 4 The distinction
is that the jus accrescendi, right of survivorship, as an incident of joint
tenancy at common law gives the survivor a new estate by the addition of
a moiety to his prior interest; 65 whereas, the interest of the surviving
spouse in an entireties estate is in theory not altered. Death of one tenant
merely reduces the legal personage holding the estate to an individuality
identical with the natural person.
At first blush the court in giving persons who tried to take an estate
by the entireties, and who were incapable of taking such an estate, a joint
tenancy appears to give them nothing. This is based on the Act of March
31, 1812,66 which abolished the right of survivorship as an incident of
joint tenancies. But the statute has been interpreted so as not to prevent
the creation of the right of survivorship arising by the express words of a
will or deed or by necessary implication, and cases have held that no par-
ticular form of words need be articulated to manifest such an intention.67
Voluntary Destruction of an Estate by the Entireties.-An estate by
the entireties may be ended by voluntary partition, even during the con-
tinuance of the marriage relationship. This is normally accomplished by
having one of the spouses convey his or her interest in real estate held by
the entireties to the other who accepts it, pays the consideration and records
the deed.
68
PROPERTY RIGHTS OF THE RESPECTIVE SPOUSES
Generally, the fact that a particular chair was always called "father's
chair" does not of itself establish the proposition that he is the true owner
for all purposes. Even "mother's silver" may turn out to be the property
of her husband. As between a wife and her husband possession or use
63. 76 A.2d 197 (Pa. 1950).
64. One of the most important differences is that a creditor of one of the
parties can enforce his lien on that party's moiety. Other differences exist, e.g.,
taxation.
65. Frederick, Adm'r. v. Southwick, 165 Pa. Super. 78, 67 A.2d 802 (1949).
66. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 121 (Purdon, 1950).
67. Mardis v. Steen, 293 Pa. 13, 141 Atl. 629 (1928); Arnold v. Jack's Execu-
tor's, 24 Pa. 57 (1854) ; Montgomery v. Keystone Savings & Loan Ass'n., 150 Pa.
Super. 577, 29 A.2d 203 (1943); see Teacher v. Kijurina, 76 A.2d 197, 201 (Pa.
1950).
68. Runco v. Ostroski, 361 Pa. 593, 65 A.2d 399 (1949) ; Kauffman v. Stenger,
151 Pa. Super. 313, 30 A.2d 239 (1943).
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of personal property is no indicia of title. Nor can any satisfactory con-
clusion be drawn from the mere fact that a particular article was bought
and paid for by one of the spouses. Even though a wife may allow her
husband during his lifetime to sell her personal property and deposit the
proceeds in his own account, it does not necessarily follow that such a
practice would continue indefinitely or that the personal property in ques-
tion should be considered as belonging to the husband's estate in case of
death. 69 In the normal happy home ,the family financial arrangements
are in such a state of inextricable confusion that no one can say with any
degree of certainty who has paid for anything.
Property Belonging to the Husband Before Marriage.-Apart from
the wife's inchoate right of dower, common law gave the wife no immediate
interest in the husband's property. The husband was the legal unit.
Modern legislation which gave to the wife certain rights did not necessitate
any general reclassification of the husband's capacity as to his property.
The husband remains, after marriage as before, the master of his own
assets, except that he cannot bar the wife's dower or statutory share.70
Property Belonging to the Wife Before Marriage.-Marriage at com-
mon law was a very costly undertaking for a woman with property, for
upon marriage the husband automatically became entitled to the usufruct
of her real property as long as coverture lasted.71 Further the husband
could, if he so desired, alienate his interest in the property so held, and it
was subject to execution for his debts.72 The husband took absolute title
to her personal property 73 except for her paraphernalia; 74 he received
the power to dispose of his wife's choses in action to himself or to a third
party. However, if such power was not exercised he lost all rights
therein.75 The husband was also entitled to the use and income of all his
wife's chattels real, with the power of disposition during coverture, and
those which were undisposed of became his property absolutely, if he sur-
vived his spouse. 76 These generous gifts to the husband of property owned
at the time of the marriage by his wife, resulted from the theoretical ter-
mination of the separate legal existence of the wife by virtue of the mar-
riage in which her rights, capacity and will was from then on represented
by the husband.
77
69. Hoar v. Axe, 22 Pa. 381 (1853); Heltzel's Estate, 52 D. & C. 337 (Pa.
O.C. 1945).
70. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 176 (1935).
71. 1 BL Comm. *445; For an interesting discussion of the tenancy by the
marital right see Haskins, The Estate By The Marital Right, 97 U. OF PA. L. REV.
345 (1949).
72. 2 KENT, Comm. *131; Haskins, op. cit. supra note 71.
73. 1 BL. Comm. *445; see VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 70 at § 167.
74. See text infra at note 101.
75. Gochenaur's Estate, 23 Pa. 460 (1854); Torbert v. Twining, 1 Yeates 432
(Pa. 1795).
76. GLANViLLE, DE LEGIBUs, VI, 3, BRAcToN, DE LEGmIus, fol. 429b.
77. Howard v. Menifer, 5 Ark. 668, 671 (1843).
The impact of these harsh common law rules apparently was eased to
some extent in the case of Rogers v. Fales.78 Although the case dealt
specifically with property acquired by a wife after marriage, the rationale of
the court indicated that upon marriage the spouses could agree that the
wife would retain her property. If such intent were clearly established,
the agreement would be enforceable.
Subsequently, the Married Women's Property Act of 1848 79 emanci-
pated married women from the fetters imposed by the common law. By
virtue of the Act, marriage no longer automatically confers a gift on a
husband of either his wife's chattels in possession, her power over choses
in action, or her real or personal property.80 On the contrary the property
of a married woman belongs to her as if she were single and she cannot
be deprived of it by her husband without her consent. If necessary, the
wife may sue for it in her own name. 1
However, a married woman's claim that she owned certain property
before marriage must be proved by evidence which does not admit of a
reasonable doubt.8 2 Further, the courts, apparently because of the con-
fidential relationship of the husband and wife, will scrutinize more care-
fully any transaction in which it is a question of the wife prevailing over
the creditors of the husband. For past experience justifies a fear by our
judicial authorities of fraud and collusion between spouses.
Property Acquired by the Husband After Marriage.-As indicated
previously, at common law, by virtue of the marriage a husband acquired
substantial interests in all of his wife's property. But by the Married
Women's Property Act of 1848, this operation of law was negatived, and
the wife retained her pre-marital property rights.
Property given to a husband after marriage, or purchased by him
with his funds, is and remains his own.83 Serious questions, however,
arise when transfers are made from a wife to her spouse or when she
allows her husband to obtain her funds directly. Where no valid con-
78. 5 Pa. 154 (1847). This case was overruled on procedure by Good v. Mylin,
8 Pa. 51, 55 (1848) but substantive law was still followed in Goodyear v. Rumbaugh,
13 Pa. 480, 481 (1850).
79. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 48, § 64 (Purdon 1930): "Every species and descrip-
tion of property, whether consisting of real, personal or mixed, which may be owned
by or belong to any single woman, shall continue to be the property of such woman,
as fully after marriage as before; and all such property-which shall accrue to any
married woman during coverture-shall be owned, used and enjoyed by such mar-
ried woman as her own separate property . . ."
80. Musser v. Gardner, 66 Pa. 242 (1870) Martin v. Davis, 30 Pa. Super. 54
(1906); Heltzel's Estate, 52 D. & C. 337 (Pa. O.C. 1945).
81. Gicker's Adm'rs. v. Martin, 50 Pa. 138 (1865); Goodyear v. Rumbaugh, 13
Pa. 480 (1850) ; Remaley v. Remaley, 37 Luzerne L. Reg. Rep. 411 (Pa. C.P. 1944)
(gifts to wife prior to marriage remain her property upon marriage).
82. Gamber v. Gamber, 18 Pa. 363 (1852) in which husband and wife ordered
a carriage from X. Later husband died and wife claimed carriage as belonging to
her, on the ground that she had given her husband the money to pay for it. The
court found that it was not the wife's money. A factor which might have influenced
the court to so hold was that the husband died insolvent.
83. Remaley v. Remaley, 37 Luzerne L. Reg. Rep. 411 (Pa. C.P. 1944).
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sideration supports the transfer, there is a presumption, that it creates a
trust for the wife rather than a gift to her husband.
8 4
(a) Possession by husband of wife's funds and personal property.-
The mere possession of a wife's money by a husband is in itself no evi-
dence, since the Act of 1848, that title to it is vested absolutely in him.8 5
The presumption of a trust arises from a piercing by the courts of the veil
of marriage, which in the ordinary situation shows the wife's subordination
and fidelity to the husband and the necessity for protecting her against
abuse of the relationship by the husband.88 Even in the situation where
a wife wants to give personal property which she owns outright to her
husband, the burden is upon the husband to establish a gift,8 7 and if the
husband's heirs or his creditors claim that money received by the husband
from his spouse is a gift, the burden is upon those who make such an
allegation to maintain it by proof.
8 8
Yet, in a situation where creditors rights are involved, the court
sometimes use some sort of estoppel to protect them over the rights of the
wife. For example, in Nolen's Appeal," the wife received from the estate
of her father $1617.68, which she gave to her husband to deposit in a
bank for her use. The husband, however, deposited it in his bank to his
own credit, and used it. The wife tried to recover the sum from her
husband's insolvent estate. The court did not apply the presumption of
a trust, but on the contrary, said that in converting the money to his own
use, the husband was in the exercise of a legal right, which could not be
question at the expense of his creditors. This again is a situation where
the court fears some type of fraud resulting from the intimate relationship
of husband and wife.
Neither will the presumption of a trust in favor of the wife apply if
the wife directs her husband to dispose of or expend her own separate
estate, in a particular manner, for her benefit and comfort. When this is
done the courts hold that the wife is bound by her own acts and she can
not obtain a return of the money or property.90 The same doctrine will
apply, as long as the husband uses his wife's property with her knowledge,
consent and approval.91 In Gleghorne v. Gleghorne,92 a bill in equity was
filed by a wife against her spouse in order to recover a sum of money
which had been expended by her to aid in the construction of a dwelling
for their home upon real estate purchased by the husband. It was held
that when a wife's money is received by the husband and appropriated by
84. Hamill's Appeal, 88 Pa. 363 (1879).
85. Hamill's Appeal, supra note 84; Estate of Bardsley, 13 Phila. 222 (Pa.
1879).
86. See Werle v. Werle, 332 Pa. 49, 1 A.2d 244 (1938).
87. Estate of Bardsley, 13 Phila. 222 (Pa. 1879).
88. Estate of Wormley, 137 Pa. 101, 20 Atl. 621 (1890).
89. 23 Pa. 37 (1854).
90. Johnston v. Johnston's Adm'r., 31 Pa. 450 (1858).
91. Kreider's Estate, 212 Pa. 587, 61 Atl. 1115 (1905).
92. 118 Pa. 383, 11 Atl. 797 (1888).
him at her request towards the building of a dwelling house for a common
home, without circumstances indicating the relation of debtor and creditor,
the wife may not reclaim the money by a subsequent proceeding against
the husband. A comparable question may arise where a husband has no
earnings or private income and receives an allowance from his wife with
which he buys various chattels. Do they belong to him? This appears
to be a question of fact, and there is a good chance of it being decided in
favor of the husband. As previously indicated, there is authority for the
proposition that the presumption of a trust, which arises in favor of the
wife will not be rigidly adhered to and courts in certain situations will
imply a valid gift to the husband, 3 or if the husband rebuts the presump-
tion of a trust, the court will hold that it was a gift.94 Under such con-
ditions, a husband has complete control over the purchases.
(b) Transfer of real property from wife to husband.-Legislation has
virtually eliminated many of the problems which formerly arose in the
transfer of real property from a wife to her husband. At common law, a
wife was powerless to convey her lands directly to her spouse for as
Blackstone noted, she was not considered to have a separate existence.95
However, an indirect conveyance between the spouses through the medium
of a third party was valid. 96
Even after the Married Women's Property Act of 1848 a wife could
not convey her real estate to her husband, unless it affirmatively appeared
from all the surrounding circumstances that it was by her own volition
and was not induced by his undue influence. 97 Strict judicial interpreta-
tion placed on these requisites by the courts virtually cut off all conveyances
of realty by a wife to her spouse. In fact, in a later decision the court said
that a deed from a wife to her spouse was absolutely void and of no more
than a blank piece of paper because of the inability of the grantor to divest
her title, and also because of the incompetency of the grantee to take.98
This feudal rule which should have been rendered a nullity by the Act of
1848 was changed specifically by the Act of June 3, 1911, 9 which allows
a wife to make a direct conveyance to her husband. Spouses were thereby
93. E.g., Kreider's Estate, 212 Pa. 587, 61 At. 1115 (1905); Gleghorne v.
Gleghorne, 118 Pa. 383, 11 Atl. 797 (1888); Johnston v. Johnston's Adm'r., 31 Pa.
450 (1858); Nolen's Appeal, 23 Pa. 37 (1854).
94. Estate of Bardsley, 13 Phila. 222 (Pa. 1879) (indicates presumption of trust
in favor of wife in this situation is rebutable).
95. 1 B. Comm. *442.
96. VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 70, § 182.
97. Darlington's Appeal, 86 Pa. 512 (1878).
98. Elder v. Elder, 256 Pa. 139, 100 AtI. 581 (1917).
99. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 48, §71 (Purdon 1930): "It shall be lawful for a
married woman to make conveyances of real estate to her husband as if she were a
feme sole." This was amended by the Act of May 31, 1947, P.L. 352, No. 160
§ 1 which allowed a wife to convey to her husband and herself jointly, PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 48, § 71 (Purdon Supp. 1949). See also PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 541
(Purdon Supp. 1949) for another statute reaching the same result as this amend-
ment.
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placed in the same position as strangers with regard to the transfer of real
property.'
00
Property Acquired by the Wife After Marriage.-As indicated previ-
ously, at common law all of the wife's property upon marriage became for
practical purposes the husband's property. Certain reversionary interests
were retained by her, however, and thus upon her husband's death, she
regained full rights in her real property and title to her undisposed of
paraphernalia. 1 1 But the latter property remained subject to claims of
her spouse's creditors.'10 2  Today, these ancient doctrines are of little prac-
tical significance, for as a result of legislative enactments, the property
which a wife brings to the marriage, or which she afterwards acquires with
her own means or from third persons, remains her own.' 03 Proof of her
ownership must be made by evidence which does not admit of a reasonable
doubt. In the case of a purchase after marriage, clear proof must be sub-
mitted that the funds used were not supplied by her husband.10 4
(a) Property Held by Husband as Trustee for Wife.-In order to
protect the wife's property interest when her husband has control and
ownership of her property, courts have frequently invoked "constructive
trust" or "agency" doctrines. Instances of this procedure have already
been given. A further example is reflected in the case of Bancord v.
Kuhn.105 There, although a father deeded land to his daughter and her
husband, the court found that the grantor's intent was for his daughter
to have sole interest in the property. Hence the husband merely held the
property as trustee for his wife, and it was not subject to claims of his
creditors.
(b) Transfers by Husband to Wife.-Transfers of possession of prop-
erty from husbands to their wives have frequently caused much confusion
and litigation. If they were reasonable and not in fraud of creditors,
equity, even before the Married Women's Property Act of 1848, frequently
sustained the gift, even though there was no intervention of a trustee.106
100. Elder v. Elder, 256 Pa. 139, 100 Atl. 581 (1917) indicates that this will
be the result of the Act of June 3, 1911.
101. A wife's wearing apparel, articles of luxury and personal ornaments suitable
to her rank and degree. Sawyer v. Sawyer, 28 Vt. 249, 251 (1856); Howard v.
Menifee, 5 Ark. 668, 671 (1843); Graham v. Londonderry, [1746] 3 Atk. 393, 26
Eng. Rep. 1026; 2 BL. Comm. *435; VERNIER, AMFRICAN FAMILY LAWS § 170
(1935).
102. Howard v. Menifee, supra note 101; Lord Hastings v. Douglas, [1633]
Cro. Car. 343, 79 Eng. Rep. 901.
103. VmNmRI, op. cit. supra note 70, § 167.
104. E.g., Jack v. Kintz, 177 Pa. 571, 35 Atl. 867 (1896); Bower's Appeal, 68
Pa. 126 (1871); Baringer v. Stiver, 49 Pa. 129, 13 Wright 129 (1865); Gamber
v. Gamber, 18 Pa. 363 (1852).
105. 36 Pa. 383 (1860).
106. Herr's Appeal, 5 W. & S. 494 (Pa. 1843) (before Married Women's Prop-
erty Act of 1848) ; William's Appeal. Moore's Estate, 47 Pa. 307 (1864) (after mar-
ried Women's Property Act of 1848). As to rights of creditors see Townsend v.
Maynard, 45 Pa. 198 (1864); Chadwick Estate, 154 Pa. Super. 157, 35 A.2d
582 (1943).
Originally, such a gift had to be established by clear and convincing proof,
not only of the act of donation and delivery, but of the wife's separate
custody. 0 7 Later a husband was allowed to make a valid gift to his spouse
although she, in fact, knew absolutely nothing of the transaction at the
time, and did not then accept it. The wife's acceptance could be pre-
sumed.'0 8 But the courts indicate, that it is for the jury to determine if
there was a bona fide gift to the wife or whether the arrangement was
simply a fictitious one under which it was understood by the parties that
the real ownership was still to be in the husband. The court will set aside
any transfer between spouses that is a sham.
If a husband buys real estate and has the deed made to his wife (no
interests of creditors involved) the legal presumption is that a gift was
intended. If the husband, in such a situation, subsequently claims a trust
in his favor, he must, in order to rebut the presumption, prove by clear,
explicit and unequivocal evidence, not only the fact of payment of the
purchase money by him, but all the essential requisites of the alleged
trust.1 09
Where a husband permits some of his own money and his wife's
earnings to be deposited in a bank in his wife's name, and never after-
wards claims the money, and the wife subsequently makes additional
deposits, the presumption is that the husband intended the original deposit
as a gift to her.110 Also money on deposit in the name of the wife is prima
facie her money, and where the husband claims it at her death the burden
is on him to prove that it is his property."' Today there is a general
presumption existing in all dealings between husband and wife that all
real or personal property bought in the name of the wife with the funds
of the husband or transferred from the husband to the wife without con-
sideration is a gift to her.
112
In the ordinary household the wife constantly has the spending money
piovided by her husband either specially or by way of allowance. To
whom do chattels bought by her out of this money belong? It is obvious
that if he gives her a dress allowance the clothes she buys are her own.113
But it is not every domestic allowance that involves a personal gift. It was
early decided in regard to the savings by the wife, during coverture out
of the "house money" which was entrusted to her, that she receives and
107. William's Appeal. Herr's Appeal, 5 W. & S. 494 (Pa. 1843); Moore's
Estate, 47 Pa. 307 (1864).
108. Sparks v. Hurley, 208 Pa. 166, 57 At. 364 (1904) (where husband trans-
fers an account with a firm of stockbrokers from his own name to that of his wife,
and the brokers made the transfer on their books, the wife may subsequently main-
tain an action against the brokers for trover, if they sell the securities in that
account for a debt of the husband, without notice to her, or to her husband as her
agent in managing the account).
109. Earnest's Appeal, 106 Pa. 310 (1884).
110. Klenke's Estate (No. 1), 210 Pa. 572, 60 Atl. 166 (1905).
111. Crosetti's Estate, 211 Pa. 490, 60 AtL. 1081 (1905).
112. See Werle v. Werle, 332 Pa. 49, 51, 1 A.2d 244 (1938).
113. McDevitt v. Vial, 7 Sadler 585, 11 Atl. 645 (Pa. 1887) (money or prop-
erty which is donated to a wife for her own use, and for the use of her family, is
her separate property).
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spends that money for the common benefit of the family, as the agent for
her husband, and the articles she purchases with it are and remain the
husband's property. The possession of such funds by a wife ordinarily
implies no more than that she is holding them for safekeeping for her
husband.114  In Raybold v. Raybold," 5 the court held that meritorious as
the wife's industry and frugality was, the savings by her during coverture
enured to the benefit of her husband. Therefore, if real estate was pur-
chased with funds thus acquired, any trust that may result by operation
of law would be for the benefit of the husband and not to the wife. The
court also pointed out that while the Married Women's Property Act of
1948 had done much to change the legal incidents of the marriage relation,
it had not extinguished quite all of the marital rights of the husband. The
husband is still entitled to the benefits of his wife's industry and economy.
Closely related to transfers from husband to wife is the situation
where a husband's property is purchased by an outsider at a bona fide
sheriff's sale and is subsequently given to the wife. Under such conditions,
the property is free from the claims of the husband's creditors. 116 Also
of interest is the recognition by equity that a married woman may stand
in the relation of a creditor of her husband. Clear and satisfactory evi-
dence is necessary to establish the validity of the debt. 1 7 However, proof
of the debt does not impose an obligation on the husband to pay interest,
as he would if the debt were to other creditors." 8
(c) The Wife's Earnings.-At common law, the services and earn-
ing capacity of the wife belonged to the husband alone. He was accord-
ingly entitled to all of her earnings even before they were reduced to pos-
session.1 9 Likewise, if the earnings were the joint earnings of the hus-
band and wife they belonged to the husband and not to the wife.12° This
was based on the theory that the husband was under a duty to support his
,wife and his family; therefore, he was entitled to their earnings.' 2 ' Even
after the Married Women's Property Act of 1848 the same rule of law
prevailed.122  Ordinarily, only the husband or his personal representative
.could maintain an action for the wages of the wife's labor and services.
If, however, the employer made an express agreement with the wife, it
-appears that she could maintain an action for the wages after the hus-
band's demise.'23
114. Parvin v. Capewell, 45 Pa. 89 (1863).
115. 20 Pa. 308 (1853) This decision considers a wife's earnings and savings
together; for the sake of logical development they have been divided in this note.
116. E.g., Gibson v. Sutton, 3 Sadler 505, 6 Atl. 912 (Pa. 1886) ; Hess v. Brown,
111 Pa. 124, 2 Atl. 416 (1885); Wieman v. Anderson, 42 Pa. 311 (1862).
117. Tripner v. Abrahams, 47 Pa. 220 (1864).
118. Morrish v. Morrish, 262 Pa. 192, 105 Atl. 8 (1918).
119. Hallowell v. Horter, 35 Pa. 375 (1860).
120. McDermott's Appeal, 106 Pa. 358 (1884); Hallowell v. Horter, mtpra note
119.
121. See McDevitt v. Vial, 7 Sadler 585, 11 Atl. 645 (Pa. 1887).
122. McDevitt v. Vial, 7 Sadler 585, 11 Atl. 645 (Pa. 1887); Walker v. Reamy,
36 Pa. 410 (1860).
123. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAmY LAWS § 173 (1935).
This doctrine did not coincide with the trend to give a wife the same
rights as her spouse, and hence, the Act of May 3, 1872,124 was enacted
which gave married women the right to keep their separate earnings. It is
an interesting side-light that in Lewis Estate, 25 where a married woman
attended a boarder, cleaned his room, administered medicine to him, and
later claimed compensation for her services, the court made no reference
to the Act of 1872 but construed another statute 1 26 and allowed recovery,
holding that the earnings belonged to her and not to her spouse. The
result is still the law today.
1 2
7
Household Property.-The presumption of the law is that where a
man and woman are cohabitating as husband and wife, the household
property belongs to the husband.12 8  A wife claiming such property is
required to substantiate her claim by proof sufficient to repel all adverse
presumptions.1
29
Against this background came the lower court decision of McCarter's
Estate, 30 which raised the question as to whether the furnishings of a
home, such as a living-room suite, a player piano, and an electric ice-box,
belonged to the wife upon her husband's death. The court in a well-
reasoned opinion by Judge (now Mr. Justice) Ladner proceeded on the
theory that the husband and wife lived together; therefore, there could
be no separate possession for the property was at all times in the joint
possession of the spouses. Hence, the inference to be drawn must be that
the furniture so possessed was intended for the use, comfort and benefit
of both, and in the absence of any proof to the contrary a fair presumption
is that title was, in fact, in both husband and wife as tenants by the en-
tireties. This being so, title to such property rests exclusively in the
surviving spouse.
Subsequently, another court'13 ' recognized Judge Ladner's explana-
tion but insisted on following the time-worn rule that household property
is presumed to belong to the husband. It stated, however, that even under
Judge Ladner's reasoning, the facts of this case did not support an estate
by the entirety. Still later, the matter appeared to be settled finally when
the Superior Court restated and adopted the old rule of a presumption in
favor of the husband.' 3 2  Then came another learned decision by Judge
124. PA. STAT. ANIt., tit. 48, § 34 (Purdon, 1930): "The separate earnings of
any married woman of the State of Pennsylvania, whether said earnings shall be
wages for labor, salary, property, business or otherwise, shall accrue to and enure
to the separate benefit and use of said married woman, and be under the control
of such married woman independently of her husband
125. 156 Pa. 337, 27 AtI. 35 (1893).
126. Act of June 8, 1887, P.L. 332.
127. Martin v. Davis, 30 Pa. Super. 59 (1906). This case although stating and
following the statutory rule, does not at any point cite the statute.
128. E.g., McDevitt v. Vial, 7 Sadler 585, 11 Atl. 645 (Pa. 1887); Rhoads v.
Gordon, 38 Pa. 277 (1861) ; Chadwick Estate, 154 Pa. Super. 157, 35 A.2d 582 (1943).
129. Kauffman v. Stenger, 151 Pa. Super. 313, 30 A.2d 239 (1943).
130. 36 D. & C. 625 (Pa. O.C. 1939).
131. May Estate, 63 D. & C. 634 (Pa. O.C. 1948).
132. Matheny Estate, 164 Pa. Super. 18, 63 A.2d 477 (1949).
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Ladner in Schwarts Estate,13 where the court explained why it refused to
follow the old rule. It was pointed out that the old rule of law was based
on the case of Rhoads v. Gordon,'8 4 decided in 1861. Since that time the
Married Women's Property Acts of 1887185 and 1893186 rendered that
case of no further precedent value. These Acts, in effect, unshackled
married women and gave them the right to own and possess property, even
though it appeared to be in the control of the husband. They raised the
same presumption of ownership by the wife in regard to possession of
personal property that existed in other individuals.'8 7 The court further
pointed out that Rhoads v. Gordon, which was relied on by the Superior
Court, was never cited for this proposition by the Supreme Court subse-
quent to the Acts of 1887 and 1893. Therefore, the court felt justified
in following its earlier ruling and held that there is, as to ownership of
household furniture and furnishings in the joint possession of the spouses,
a fair presumption, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that title to the
same is in both husband and wife by the entireties. But this decision was
reversed on appeal to the Superior Court, which stated, "In Matheny
Estate . . . we held that the presumption was that household goods belong
to the husband. To this rule we adhere. It was based upon the duty of a
husband to provide his wife with a home, which, of course, means house-
hold goods and not merely roof and walls. This duty of the husband is
unaffected by the married women's property acts." 138
Thus, it remains to be seen which position the Supreme Court will
fake. The "Ladner View" is based on the normal presumptions that flow
from joint possession and use. It appears to be more consistent with the
currently accepted philosophy that marriage is a partnership, with a wife
being entitled to an equal interest in all household goods in return for her
services rendered in caring for the children and making the home a place
of comfort for the entire family. On the other hand, the Superior Court
places prime emphasis on the duty of a husband to support his wife, and
holds that this obligation, in the absence of other evidence, precludes a
presumption of joint ownership in the property. In the long run the duty
should fall upon the legislature, after considering carefully the numerous
social and economic factors involved, to pass legislation which will properly
mirror the best interests of society.
Gifts to the Husband and Wife Jointly.-Since the discarding of the
common law rules, it is obvious that if any property is given expressly to
a married couple, they become joint owners, and can only be so treated.
But when can a chattel be said to be given to both husband and wife?
It is very seldom that one hears of such a specific gift. The question
whether a gift is to one or both seems to be a question of fact to be decided
133. 68 D. & C. 154 (Pa. O.C. 1949).
134. 38 Pa. 277 (1861).
135. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 48, § 6 (Purdon, 1930).
136. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 48, § 31 et seq. (Purdon, 1930).
137. See Fink's Estate, 77 Pa. Super. 267, 272 (1921).
138. Schwartz Estate, 166 Pa. Super. 459, 71 A.2d 831 (1950).
with regard to all the surrounding circumstances of the case. The question
frequently arises in the case of wedding presents. Probably it can be
assumed that a wedding present which is of a personal nature is meant
for either husband or wife, i.e., a, jeweled bracelet woult obviously be
intended for the wife alone; diamond studs and cuff links would be intended
for the husband. However, most wedding presents are intended to equip
or adorn the home-a silver tray to be used on a common table, a painting
to be hung over the fireplace in the living-room. Can these ever be said
to be personal gifts to either spouse? In determining this issue it is proper
to consider the origin of the gift, and the relationship of the donor to the
husband or wife. In a few scattered instances the gift may be shown to
be a personal gift to. one of the spouses, but generally presents which are
to be used or enjoyed jointly should be considered the same as property
purchased by the spouses jointly, 39 and hence should belong to the husband
and wife by the entireties.
EFFECT OF DIVORCE ON PROPERTY OWNED BY TIHE SPOUSES
There is not much "law" with regard to the property rights of the
spouses upon either an absolute or limited divorce. This appears to result
from: (1) the fact that property rights are generally settled between the
former spouses, or (2) the cases are adjudicated in county courts, whose
opinions are not reported, and the parties do not appeal. Hence, the
following is merely an exposition of the reported "law" on this subject.
Divorce A Vinculo Matrimonii.-At common law the property inter-
ests of the spouses were considerably affected by a divorce from the bonds
of matrimony--a Vinculo Matrimonii. Blackstone said ". . . in cases of
total divorce, the marriage is declared null, as having been absolutely
unlawful ab initio. .. ,, 140 This would seem to indicate that the former
husband lost all rights in his former wife's realty. Further, it appears
that the wife recovered all of her personal property, choses in action and
chattels real. Chancellor Kent indicates that this harsh rule was abro-
gated by statutes in the colonies, so that the disposition of property de-
pended upon who was the injured party. If it was the wife, she regained
possession of all of her real and personal property; if it was the husband,
he retained his interest in the wife's property.'
41
Today, an absolute divorce does not produce such marked changes
in property rights. This is because of the Married Women's Property
Acts, which allows a wife to hold separate property. Therefore, upon
divorce each party takes the property (real or personal) which belonged
to him or her before and during the marriage. As to common property
such as household goods, the law is still unsettled. As indicated previ-
139. Remaley v. Remaley, 37 Luzeme L. Reg. 411 (Pa. C.P. 1944.)
140. 1 BL Comm. *440.
141. 2 KENT COMM. *99.
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ously, there is a presumption of ownership by the husband, and if this is
not overcome, apparently upon divorce, the husband takes all of the
household furriture and furnishings.
Tenancy by the entireties presents a different problem upon divorce.
In most jurisdictions since the divorce dissolves the so-called entity of
the spouses upon which the theory of tenancy by the entireties is based,
such a tenancy cannot continue after divorce and becomes either a joint
tenancy or a tenancy in common.14 Pennsylvania courts once took
a contrary view, holding that an estate held by the entireties is not ter-
minated by a divorce.143 They refused to allow a husband to maintain an
action of assumpsit against his divorced wife for rents and profits, ac-
cruing after divorce, from real estate and personalty acquired during
coverture, holding that the former spouses still held by the entireties in all
respects. 4 4  This doctrine, although not expressly overruled, was modified
by the decision of O'Malley v. O'Malley.145 In that case the court said that
although the character of the tenancy is not changed by an absolute
divorce of the parties, as between the parties a different situation arises.
Hence, if a fund consisting of the rents and profits of such property held
by the entireties is before the court for distribution, it will be equally
divided between the former husband and wife-no other equities inter-
vening-since upon divorce they become, for all practical purposes, tenants
in common as to rental income. The rationale of that decision was that a
gross inequity would result where one former spouse, who has theoretically
an equal right with the other, takes all of the fund. The court foresaw
the possibility of bodily harm being committed and the public peace being
disturbed if the other former spouse forcibly endeavored to obtain his or
her legal rights. It believed that these considerations gave a powerful
warning that a conclusion which results in such an injustice is imbued with
error and should be eliminated. 146 This doctrine has been applied even
when after divorce one of the parties continues to occupy real estate held
by the entireties; that former spouse is liable to the other for the fair
rental value of the property less expenses necessarily paid for the preserva-
tion of the property. 47 Also a divorced wife who had previously ob-
tained a judgment for the support of the children of the marriage can
enforce it against property formerly held by the entireties as if there had
been no divorce.1
48
f42. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 97 (1932).
143. E.g., Alles v. Lyon, 216 Pa. 604, 66 Atl. 81 (1907) ; Witman v. Webner, 25
Berks 29 (Pa. C.P. 1923), aff'd, 108 Pa. Super. 188, 165 Atl. 256 (1933) ; Magee v.
Morton Building & Loan Ass'n., 103 Pa. Super. 331, 158 Atl. 647 (1931).
144. Hilt v. Hilt, 50 Pa. Super. 455 (1912).
145. 272 Pa. 528, 116 Atl. 500 (1922).
146. Cornelius v. Cornelius, 104 Pa. Super. 455, 160 Atl. 150 (1932).
147. Mertz v. Mertz, 28 Del. 138, 35 D. & C. 26 (Pa. C.P. 1939), rev'd on other
grounds, 139 Pa. Super. 299, 11 A.2d 514 (1940). The property in question here was
acquired before the Act of May 10, 1927, infra, and hence it was held not to apply.
148. Act of May 24, 1923, P.L. 446, § 5, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 48, § 141 (Purdon,
1930).
Under the Act of May 10, 1927,149 property held by a husband and
wife as tenants by the entireties is upon divorce conclusively presumed to
belong one-half to each party.150 This in effect codifies the rule of law
developed by the courts in order to prevent considerable injustice.
Some county courts interpreting the Act said it did not apply to per-
sonalty; 151 others said it applied to personal property as well as to
realty.152 The dispute was finally resolved by the Supreme Court's holding
that the Act gives divorced spouses a remedy of partition in equity of
property held by the entireties whether real, personal or a chose in action
and whether the estate is equitable or legal.
158
Divorce A Mensa Et Thoro.-A divorce a mensa et thoro creates a
legal separation from bed and board, but it does not put an end to the
marriage ties, it merely suspends certain mutual rights and obligations of
the parties for a limited time.-'5 It has even been declared that a divorce
from bed and board is little more than an adjudication, by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction, that the wife could live apart from her husband without
being guilty of desertion and still remain a wife.'5 5 Reconciliation and
cohabitation of the husband and wife after such a divorce restores the
marriage relationship and the rights of the respective spouses which flow
therefrom.' 55
Generally the statutes dealing with the effect of an absolute divorce
on the property of the spouses are so phrased as to admit of their being
applied to an action for divorce a mensa et thoro. Hence, property rights
in a divorce from bed and board are the same as those which exist in a
divorce from the bonds of matrimony.
As long as the decree remains in force, the wife, under the Act of
April 11, 1927,' 57 has power to encumber and convey her separate real
estate in the Commonwealth, whether acquired before or after the decree,
149. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 68, § 501 et seq. (Purdon, 1931): "In any case where
a husband and wife shall hereafter acquire property as tenants by entireties and
shall be divorced, the interest of each of the respective tenants by entireties, subse-
quent to said divorce, shall be conclusively deemed to be one-half of the value of the
property. . . ." This was amended by the Act of May 17, 1949, PA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 68, § 501 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1949), which adds that upon divorce the parties
shall hold the property as tenants in common of equal one-half shares.
150. Cox v. Cox, 35 Del. 422 (Pa. C.P. 1949) ; Edwards v. Edwards, 69 D. & C.
13-6 (Pa. C.P. 1948) ; Lanare v. Lanare, 76 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1950) construed the 1927
Act strictly and held tenancy did not end until sale).
151. Barrett v. Barrett, 7 Lawrence 20, 62 D. & C. 362 (Pa. C.P. 1948).
152. Wells v. Brown, 63 Montg. 310, 61 D. & C. 511 (Pa. C.P. 1948).
153. Blunmer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 362 Pa. 7, 66 A.2d 245 (1949).
154. Hill v. Hill, 62 Pa. Super. 439 (1916).
155. See Rutherford v. Rutherford, 152 Pa. Super. 517, 525, 32 A.2d 921, 926
(1943).
156. Rudolph's Estate, 128 Pa. Super. 459, 194 Atl. 311 (1937).
157. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 48, § 117a (Purdon, 1930) : "Whenever a decree of
divorce from bed and board . . . [be] granted to any married woman . . . it shall
be lawful for such married woman to encumber . . . or dispose of, real estate . . .
or any interest therein, however and whenever acquired, whether before or after the
entry of such decree, with as full and complete power in all respects as if she were
a feme sole, and without her husband joining in, consenting to, or acknowledging any
deed, mortgage, or other instrument. .. ."
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as though she were a feme sole. In Scaife v. McKee,
158 plaintiff, was
divorced from her husband a mensa et thoro. Subsequently, she agreed
to convey to defendant three properties which she owned. Defendant re-
fused to accept the deed and pay the purchase price, solely because plain-
tiff's husband had not joined in the conveyance. The court held that the
1927 Act does not provide merely for the conveyance of the wife's interest
in her real estate, leaving the husband's possible tenancy by the curtesy 1
59
unaffected by the wife's deed, but gives to the wife the right to convey
"with as full and complete power in all respects as if she were a feme sole,"
that is, a fee simple title, unencumbered by any interest the husband would
have had but for the divorce.
In addition to these tangible rights which a wife may receive in a
divorce a mensa et thoro, she may also be entitled to seek permanent
alimony.160  This is commonly referred to as an intangible property right
and is an exceptionally important and valuable right, since it may com-
pensate her for the loss of some of her other property interests. The




Property rights of the spouses has been a constantly changing con-
cept to fit the particular needs and ideals of the time. We have now
reached a point where in social thought man and wife are generally con-
sidered equals. Courts have struggled with sporadic legislative enact-
ments and archaic decisions in order to harmonize the law with this
philosophy but complete accord has not been reached.
Particularly uncertain are the rights of spouses in household prop-
erty. This problem faces families of modest means, and their interests in
this type of property should be so clarified as to render unnecessary ex-
pensive litigation in order to determine their existing rights. Otherwise,
many such interests may be lost by default. Arguments previously noted
point toward the desirability of granting a wife an equal share in this
property.
16 2
Inequities may also result from the Court's refusal to allow a spouse
to obtain an accounting of property held by the entireties. Currently, it
appears that, at a minimum, the spouses must be separated and fraud
must be present before such a right exists. Since existing conditions may
preclude spouses from living apart, even though their love for each other
has dissipated, it would appear desirable for a spouse to be permitted an
158. 298 Pa. 33, 148 AtI. 37 (1929).
159. Estate by curtesy has been abolished in Pennsylvania by the Act of April 24,
1947, P.L. 80, § 5, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 1.5 (Purdon, 1950). There is now a
statutory share in lieu of curtesy.
160. Comm. v. Scholl, 156 Pa. Super. 136, 36 A.2d 719 (1944) ; Act of May 2,
1929, P.L. 1237, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 23, § 47 (Purdon, 1930).
161. Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 166 Pa. Super. 6, 70 A.2d 481 (1950) ; Com. ex rel.
Hirst v. Hirst, 113 Pa. Super. 159, 163, 172 Atl. 160, 162 (1934).
162. See text fol. note 138 supra.
accounting whenever he has reasonable grounds to believe that his interest
in such property is not being protected.16 In this connection it is inter-
esting to note that although the current rule may appear to favor neither
spouse, the one who does not have immediate control and possession of
the property-generally, the wife-is placed under a disability.
However, the scales are not always tipped in favor of the husband.
The rule that implies the creation of a trust in favor of a wife when she
transfers property to her husband represents an early attempt to counteract
the complete subservience of wives to their husbands. Although the rule
probably still retains much vigor, a re-examination of it is desirable in
view of the increased stature and independence now attributed to married
women.
It remains for the Assembly to make an exhaustive study of the
property rights of spouses and enact clarifying legislation. Consideration
should be given to the advisability of enacting a complete judicial code in
this area similar to that enacted in the field of wills and decedent estates.
164
The goal should be a combination of ideals and reality into one finite
pattern.*
Harold Cramer
Price Fixing and Royalty Provisions in Patent Licenses
The Federal Constitution declares that Congress shall have power "to
promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times
to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their respective writings
and discoveries."' Consonant with this provision, it was decided that the
reward for invention should be through exploitation scaled to supply-
demand rather than by direct government subsidy. The patent system that
has arisen since the first patent statute became effective in 1790 has played
a vital role in the industrial growth of the United States and has also raised
a host of problems. Most basic, perhaps, are the determination of what
constitutes sufficient progress in science or the useful arts to merit reward
as invention, and the determination of the nature and compass of the reward
to be granted to the inventor-investor-entrepreneur. This Note deals with
several aspects of the latter of these problems.
BACKGROUND
As the corporate form of organization continues to increase in size and
concentration, the question of how far the patent holder is to be allowed to
decide for himself, through contractual agreement, the extent of his reward
163. See text fol. note 53 .mupra.
164. PA. STAT. AN., tit. 20 (Purdon, 1950).
* While this note was at press the case of Fine v. Fine, No. 260, Jan. 2, 1951,
was decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In an opinion written by Mr.
Justice Stearne the court held that there is no presumption of ownership of house-
hold goods by a husband and that the burden of proving ownership of such goods
rests upon the spouse claiming the same.
1. U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8.
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for his patent franchise in the public domain looms ever larger. The
identity of the inventor has become largely corporate instead of individual.
As a result, the "clash and clang" of the patent and anti-trust laws has
become an arousing crescendo,2 and "the call is to create incentives to the
promotion of the industrial arts with the least hazard to the system of free
enterprise." 3
Concurrent with these changes in our economy, licensing, rather than
individual exploitation, has become a preferred means by which maximum
returns may be realized by patentees. The right to license a patent rests
upon the law of contracts 4 and is not provided for in the patent statutes 5
as is the right to assign a patent.6 A license passes no property interest
in the patent to the licensee, but only allows the licensee to make, use, or
vend the subject of the patent.7 The Supreme Court has long stated that
a patentee can enforce restrictions and conditions in a license as to the use
of the patent by the licensee.8 However, the enactment by Congress of
the Sherman Act 9 and Section 3 of the Clayton Act -o has been followed by
the pronouncement of increasingly stringent limitations upon the right of a
patentee to control a licensee's conduct. Price restrictions in patent license
contracts have been particularly controversial.
Price control exerted by one source is contrary to the basic concept of
a price structure determined by a freely competitive market which under-
lies a free enterprise economy. The Court took a clear-cut stand on price
control agreements of non-patented goods in United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Company " and held that such agreements and combinations
were illegal restraints of trade under the Sherman Act, irrespective of the
reasonableness of their effect on prices or the desirability of other purposes
of the agreement.' 2 Resale price maintenance after the initial sale is also
held illegal per se, except as permitted under the State Fair Trade Acts and
various agency plans.' 3
2. See Abramson, Economic Ba es of Patent Reform, 13 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROB. 339, 346 (1948).
3. HAMILTON, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE 169 (TNEC Monograph 31,
1941).
4. Brown Paper Co. v. Hydroloid, 32 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); United
States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 29 Fed. 17 (S.D. Ohio 1886).
5. The patentee's common law right to make, use and vend is incorporated in
the federal patent statutes. 16 STAT. 201 (1870), 35 U.S.C. § 40 (1930); Bauer
and Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913) ; Crown Tool and Die Co. v. Nye Tool
Co., 261 U.S. 24, 35 (1923).
6. 16 STAT. 203 (1870), as amended, 35 U.S.C. §47 (1941).
7. U.S. v. General Electric, 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926).
8. Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall 788 (U.S. 1869).
9. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1937).
10. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1937).
11. 310 U.S. 150 (1940) ; see F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
12. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); see WooD,
PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW 41-44 (1942). But cf. Appalachian Coals Inc. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Maple Flooring Assn. v. United States, 268
U.S. 563 (1925) ; Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1917).
13. Dr. Miles v. Park and Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). But cf. United
States v. Colgate and Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), Beech Nut Co. v. F.T.C., 257
U.S. 441 (1922). Retail price maintenance through agency agreements with retail
dealers was held legal in United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476
Patented goods stand on the same footing as other goods in interstate
and foreign commerce with regard to resale price maintenance, for the
patent owner cannot in any way control the price of patented goods once the
patentee or his licensee has sold the goods. 14  But the Bement 15 and
General Electric 16 decisions, which allowed patentee to fix the price at
which the licensee can sell the patented goods, provided a broad basis for
price restrictions in patent licenses. This is a major judicial exception to
the broad prohibition against price control.
PRICE CONTROL THROUGH PATENT LICENSES
Patented Materials and Materials Embodying Patented Elements.-
The Bement case was decided in 1903 before the problems of price controls
by private businessmen had been brought into sharp focus in the light of the
sweeping language of the Sherman Act. There, improvement patents -1
"relating to" float harrows were held to support license restrictions setting
the price of the entire unpatented harrow manufactured and sold by licensee.
This decision apparently held that a patentee might set the price of any
article embodying the patented part. Subsequently, the issue of the legality
under the Sherman Act of price control by a patentee of his licensee's sales
was again presented to the Court in United States v. General Electric Co.
in 1926.18 Defendant patentee owned two combination patents, one on an
incandescent lamp with tungsten filaments and one on a lamp filled with an
inert gas, also a process patent on a method of increasing the tensile strength
of tungsten filaments. 19 The original lamp patents on combinations em-
ploying carbon or vanadium filaments in a partial vacuum had expired, but
the patentee's dominant economic position had been continued by the issu-
ance of improvement patents in which old elements of the old combination
were replaced by new elements [vanadium by tungsten] or in which novel
elements were added [e.g., an inert gas such as argon] .20 These improve-
(1926). State Fair Trade Acts and the Miller-Tydings Act provide for resale price
maintenance of trade marked or identified goods. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1937). But any form of resale price agreement between competitors is for-
bidden. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
14. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Boston Store v.
American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918).
15. Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
16. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
17. See note 15 supra at 71. Plaintiff had assembled some eighty-five improve-
ment patents on harrow parts which did not cover the entire harrow. See National
Harrow Co. v. Bement and Sons, 47 N.Y. Supp. 462, 464 (1895) ; National Harrow
Co. v. Quick, 67 Fed. 130, 131 (1893). The Supreme Court simply held that price
restrictions in a single patent license did not violate the Sherman Act and did
not consider the broader issue raised by the plaintiff's assembling of patents to con-
trol the entire industry.
18. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
19. Id. at 480.
20. ". . . the addition of a totally new and useful element to an old combina-
tion may be patentable; but the addition must be the result of invention rather
than the mere exercise of the skill of the calling, and not one plainly indicated by
the prior art." Textile Machine Works v. Hirsch Co., 302 U.S. 490, 497 (1938).
"Through these devices the original monopoly is again rendered effective .... "
Forkosch, Economics of Anwrican Patent Law, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 157 and 406,
192-3 (1940).
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ment patents "covered completely the making" of the lamps.2 1  In holding
that such a combination patent would support fixing of the manufacturing
licensee's prices for that particular patented combination, the Court cited
the Bement case as controlling. However, it did not expressly limit the
former holding to the narrower facts of the General Electric case, but
simply stated that licensee price control was a condition of sale "normally
and reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee's
monopoly," since it prevented licensee from competing with patentee so
as "to destroy" the latter's profits from his own manufacture and sale of
the patented goods.
2 2
Recent Supreme Court decisions have placed more definite limitations
on the patentee's licensing power. For example, the owner of a combina-
tion or system patent may not use it to price fix or monopolize any portion
of an unpatented device which is an element of the patented combination,
even though the unpatented element is the most vital and distinguishing
part of the patented invention.23 Nor can a patentee tie-in, price fix, or in
any way monopolize the unpatented supplies or raw materials processed
into its patented product or used in or with its patented article, process, or
machine.2 4 In United States v. Gypsum,2 5 the Court condemned, as exceed-
21. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 481 (1926). But see
Steffen, Invalid Patents and Price Control, 56 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1946); HAMILTON,
PATENTS AND FRE ENTERPRISE 102 (TNEC Monograph 31, 1941); Kelleher, Price-
Fixing under Patent License Agreenents, 3 MONT. L. REV. 5, 31 (1942). It would
seem that Mr. C. J. Taft accurately interpreted the coverage of the claims of at
least the two combination patents owned by General Electric which were dis-
tinguishable in type from the Bement improvement patents on separate elements of
float spring tool harrows.
22. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926). It is said
that business prudence would compel a patentee not to license unless he can control
his licensee's price competition, thus depriving the public of the advantages of
quality competition. ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS AND LICENSES 435 (2d ed. 1943).
However, this justification places the reward to the inventor ahead of the public
interest in the promotion of science and useful arts with the least damage to our
free enterprise system. The Constitution does not entitle the patentee to the highest
possible reward. See United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 318 (1948)
(J. Douglas's concurring opinion).
23. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944);
Mercoid Corp. v. Minn.-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944). The doc-
trine of contributory infringement was severely curtailed if not demolished by these
cases, although it may still be enforceable where there is no misuse of patents.
See James, Use of Patents to Control Unpatented Materials, 28 J. PAT. OFF. Soc.
427 (1946) ; Bateman, Should Antitrust Penalties or Unenforceability of the Patent
Monopoly be Invoked for Misuse of the Patent Grant, 29 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 16
(1947).
24. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947): B. B. Chemical
Co. v. Ellis and Magic Tape Co., 314 U.S. 495 (1942) ; Morton Salt Co. v. G. S.
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) ; Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Co., 283
U.S. 27 (1931); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917); McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 166 F.2d 759 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 813 (1949); Standard Register Co. v. American Salebook Co., 148 F.2d
612 (2d Cir. 1945); Landis Machine Co. v. Chaso Tool Co., 141 F.2d 800 (6th
Cir. 1944) ; Dehydrators Ltd. v. Petrolite Corp. Ltd. 117 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1941)
Barber Asphalt Corp. v. La Fera Grecco Trucking Co., 116 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1940);
Phila. Co. v. Lechler Laboratories, 107 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1939); Oxford Varnish
Corp. v. Ault and Wiborg Corp., 83 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1936) ; R.C.A. v. Lord, 28
F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1928).
25. 333 U.S. 364, 400 (1948).
ing the patent monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act, the stabilization of
the prices of unpatented plaster manufactured and sold by patentee and its
licensees in conjunction with patented plaster board for use in installing
such board. The patentee had issued bulletins stating that the licenses
would be violated if the licensee reduced the price of the plaster or other
non-patented products sold with the patented board, or if he granted rebates.
The General Electric case was reconsidered recently in United States
v. Line Materials Co., 26 which held that an arrangement whereby two or
more competing patentees agreed that one of them or one of their licensees
would fix prices for all transcends the limits of the patent monopoly and
violates the Sherman Act. In a concurring opinion written by Justice
Douglas, and joined in by Justices Black, Murphy, and Rutledge, it was
stated that the General Electric doctrine should be overruled, since it is
a private perquisite written into the patent laws by judicial legislation, and
patentees should be limited to a non-price fixing royalty reward or to the
manufacture and sale of the patented subject matter by themselves at any
price that they choose. Justice Douglas noted that by allowing a patentee
to combine with his competitors to fix the prices of the products of inven-
tion, a powerful inducement is.created "for the abandonment of competition,
for a cessation of litigation concerning the validity of patents, for the ac-
ceptance of patents no matter how dubious, for the abandonment of research
in the development of competing patents," which is more than the "exclusive
right" given by the Constitution. 27  Price fixing under the General Electric
case has become an end in itself rather than a means for securing to in-
ventors their reward. Two of these Justices, Rutledge and Murphy, are
now deceased and the viewpoints of their successors, Justices Minton and
Clark, although not yet wholly ascertained, seem to favor a broader con-
struction of the patent holder's rights.2 8  The opinion of the court sup-
ported only by its writer, Justice Reed, upheld the General Electric case but
limited it strictly to its facts, distinguishing the instant case on the presence
of the cross-licensing.29 The three dissenting Justices held that the General
Electric case was binding precedent and that the instant case should not be
distinguished. Thus the battle lines have been drawn and the eventual
overthrow of the General Electric doctrine is forecast.80
The lower federal courts have reflected the changing attitude in this
area of the law. In the recent Carboloy 31 case price control of unpatented
26. 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
27. Id. at 319.
28. See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S.
827 (1950).
29. Price restrictions may be imposed solely to protect the particular patentee
and not licensees or other patentees. See Stedman, Patents and the Anti-Trust Laws,
31 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 14, 21 (1949). But cf. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Bulldog
Electric Products Co., 179 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1950).
30 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 144 (1948) condemned
a price structure which eliminated price competition between copyright licensees and
distinguished the 1926 General Electric decision.
31. United States v. General Electric Co., 80 F. Supp. 989, 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
Contra: General Electric Co. v. Willey's Carbide Tool Co., 33 F. Supp. 969 (E.D.
Mich. 1940).
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goods embodying patented components was condemned. It was noted that
the cost of the patented component was about one-third to one-half the cost
of the finished tool. On this point the court relied on the Mercoid 82 case,
and the General Electric case was not mentioned. Earlier, a similar prob-
lem was faced by a district court when the government instituted a civil
action under the Sherman Act against a parking-meter patents holding
company and its manufacturing licensees, who controlled 95-98% of the
meter business in the United States. The court pointed out that license
restrictions fixing the prices of adjunctive devices not within the claims
of the meter patents, such as coin counters, standards, collars, and "special-
ties," which were embodied in the final complete installation sold to the
ultimate consumer municipality, etc., were "obviously not bottomed on
the patent statute and were far beyond the claims on which the lawful
monopoly rests." 8 Further, compulsory licensing at a reasonable royalty
was ordered and the 1926 General Electric decision was distinguished
primarily on the ground that the patentee did not itself manufacture park-
ing meters. Therefore, even as to the patented parking meter devices, the
price restrictions in the licenses were for the licensees' benefit and not to
protect the patentee's pecuniary incentive reward, the avowed basis of
Chief Justice Taft's decision in the General Electric case.
Thus, no matter how close the connection of unpatented materials with
the subject matter of the patent, the patentee apparently may not fix their
price or in any other way exert monopoly control over them. Anything
that exceeds the precise scope of a valid patent grant cannot be brought
within any patent licensing arrangement so as to enable the licensor to
derive his pecuniary reward from the unpatented material. The patentee,
if he also manufactures the patented subject matter, can fix the price that
his manufacturing licensee can charge but he cannot fix the resale price of
the patented product.
Products of Patented Processes and Machines.-Somewhat the con-
verse of attempts to control the price of unpatented supplies and
components for patented machines, processes or articles are provisions
in licenses of patented processes and machines to fix the prices,
sales terms, sales territories, production, etc. of unpatented products
turned out by the patented process or machine. Logically, in view of
the consistently strict limitation of the patent monopoly, it should be clear
that a patentee has no such right of control by virtue of his patent grant.3 4
And when the point squarely arose for the first time in a suit for an
accounting of royalties under a license of patents on brick setting machines
and brick loading forks which fixed the price of the bricks produced, the
Seventh Circuit held that the entire license contract was void since such a
32. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
33. U.S. v. Vehicular Parking Ltd., 54 F. Supp. 828, 836 (D. Del. 1944). License
restrictions on meter servicing charges by licensee were also held not within the pro-
tection of the meter patents.
34. See Stedman, Patents and the Anti-trust Laws, 31 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 14, 19
(1949).
price control clause violated the Sherman Act, citing the Motion Picture
Patents case,35 and was not severable from the remainder of the license
contract36 This was a sound result in view of the early Sherman Act case
of Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States 3 7 in which one of the
defendants, which together produced 85% of enameled iron ware in the
nation, had licensed its manufacturing competitors to use a patented me-
chanical sieve, which spread the glaze powder much more quickly and
uniformly on the heated ironware than was possible with previous hand
operated sieves, on condition that the licensor fix the prices and sales
terms of all enamel ware produced by the licensees. The lower court
held that the tool patentee could not fix the price of the unpatented ware
produced with the aid of the patented tool and thus that the individual
licenses were illegal.38 The Supreme Court affirmed but held that all the
license agreements together established an unlawful combination whose pur-
pose and effect was to eliminate competition throughout the industry, and
on this ground distinguished the Bement case.
Yet, subsequent to these decisions, the Second Circuit held, in an action
for royalties from the license of a patented basket making machine, that
such licenses could establish the price at which the licensee might sell
the unpatented baskets produced by the patented machine, and cited the
Bement and General Electric cases 3 9 The district court in United States v.
Standard Oil of Indiana had previously for purposes of argument, "con-
ceded that such restrictive covenant may include a commodity which,
though not covered by a patent, is the product of a patented process." 40
Much doubt has been expressed as to the soundness of the Second Circuit
holding,41 which is in direct conflict with other circuits. The Sixth Cir-
cuit held in 1943 that the 1926 General Electric case did not permit the
patentee to enforce a license provision fixing prices on unpatented hobs or
gear-cutting tools produced by licensee under the plaintiff's patented grind-
ing process by a patented grinding machine; 42 and the Fifth Circuit in a
1944 decision, the Supreme Court denying certiorari, held that both a
price-fixing clause in patentee's licenses of patented basket-making machine
attachment and the oral agreements thereunder to maintain a uniform price
fixed by patentee on all baskets made and sold by licensees were illegal
under the Sherman Act and Texas antitrust statutes. It, therefore, dis-
35. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
36. American Equipment Co. v. Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., 69 F.2d 406 (7th Cir.
1934).
37. 226 U.S. 20 (1912).
38. United States v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 191 Fed. 172 (4th Cir. 1911).
39. Straight Side Basket Corp. v. Webster Basket Co., 82 F.2d 245 (2d Cir.
1936).
40. 33 F.2d 617, 629 (N.D. Ill. 1929).
41. Judge Learned Hand suggested in United States v. Aluminum Corp. of Amer-
ica, 148 F.2d 416, 438 (2d Cir. 1945) that the Second Circuit considered the problem
to be "in flux." See Blenko, Price Fixing of Unpatented Products, 19 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc. 371, 387 (1937).
42. Barber-Colman Co. v. National Tool Co., 136 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1943).
41951] NOTES
528 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99
missed the action for damages brought by some of the licensees against
the licensor.43
In view of these holdings it is highly unlikely that any attempt by a
patentee to directly set the prices of unpatented products would be approved
as "reasonably within the reward which the patentee by the grant of the
patent is entitled to secure." 44 Certainly the broad language of the Su-
preme Court in the "improper use" cases that "every use of a patent as a
means of obtaining a limited monopoly of unpatented material is prohibited
-whether the patent be for a machine, a product or a process" 4 5-indicates
that a machine or process patent no more sanctions control over the
licensee's products than it sanctions control over the material used with
the process or machine.
Price Fixing Under Invalid Patents.-It would seem at first glance to
be unthinkable that a patentee could use an invalid patent to support his
price fixing. However, since the judicial standard of inventiveness deemed
necessary for a valid patent seems to be considerably higher than the stand-
ard applied by the patent office,46 and since the validity of relatively few
patents is litigated in infringement suits or appeals from interference
proceedings, the end result may be in many situations that an unsound
patent is employed to support license restrictions. Of course once a
patent is declared to be invalid, any price fixing agreements based upon
it are illegal. But the expense of defending a patent suit for infringement
may induce a businessman to accept license control without litigating.
And since it was formerly settled law that a licensee was estopped from
contesting the validity of his licensor's patent,4 7 a wealthy and clever
patentee might establish an almost impregnable position for himself on the
basis of patent claims unlikely to be tested in the judicial forum. Until
recently, even the Justice Department was unable to raise the issue of the
validity of defendants' patents in an anti-trust suit.
However, a dictum in the Gypsum case 48 established that the gov-
ernment is not estopped to dispute the validity of patents which are set
up by defendants in defense of alleged anti-trust violations. And in the
Sola,49 MacGregor," and Katzinger 51 cases the courts held that the mere
43. Cummer-Graham Co. v. Straight Side Basket Corp., 142 F.2d 646 (5th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 726 (1945). It is interesting to note that in this case the
licensees were suing the patentee for price cutting in breach of the license agreement.
44. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926).
45. Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) ; Aero Spark Plug
Co. v. B. G. Corp., 103 F.2d 290, 294 (2d Cir. 1939).
46. Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 641 (2d Cir. 1942) (Judge
Frank's concurring opinion).
47. Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 18 How. 289 (U.S. 1855) ; United States v. Harvey
Steel Co.,' 196 U.S. 310 (1905).
48. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 386-8 (1948).
49. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
50. MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric and Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947).
51. Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947); cf. Scott
Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., Inc., 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
presence of a price fixing agreement in a patent license, though unen-
forced by the licensor, subjects the patentee to the risk of being compelled
to submit the validity of his patent to the suspicious scrutiny of courts
bent on protecting the public against unnecessary monopoly, if he wishes
to sue for damages or unpaid royalties or to enforce license restrictions.
Thus, the power of private litigation to purge our economy of invalid
patent restraints was greatly enlarged, and courts may now consider the
question of the validity of any patent where an illegal restraint of trade
might result from a licensing condition.
Indeed, in the Katzinger case, the Court said that it was immaterial
that the licensee had covenanted not to contest patent validity after termina-
tion of the agreement, for a private party may not contract to preclude
iself from protecting the public interest.5 2  Nor can the price fixing pro-
visions of licenses be severed from the rest of the license agreement.58 To
permit severance would allow the old estoppel rule to bar the licensee's
defense of patent invalidity at the will of the licensor.
Still another limitation upon the estoppel doctrine is imposed by the
cases which declare that although a licensee may be estopped to challenge
patent validity he may always show the prior state of the art involved in
an infringement suit and that he was merely practicing the teachings of
the prior art, since the court may examine the prior art to determine the
scope, as distinct from the validity, of the patent in question. 4 However,
where no price-fixing is attempted, the general rule that a licensee may
not challenge the validity of the licensed patent in a suit for royalties
retains its former vigor,55 although it has been strongly criticized. "
Thus, it is seen that the perils of price fixing in patent licenses are
numerous and the permissible area of price restriction narrow. Courts
are reflecting the spirit of the times in tending to limit sharply the wielding
by private organizations of powers that are near governmental in their
scope and which have a rigidifying impact upon our economy. For our
competitive system envisions that the natural drive of individuals for a
"sure thing" will keep the economy dynamic and defeat the too success-
ful attainment of the individual goal of monopoly. Patent litigation is un-
certain at best and price control provisions increase the odds against the
patentee several-fold, for they act as a red flag, a warning bell to alert
the courts, which regard such restrictions as among the most dangerous
threats to the maintenance of a free enterprise system. For, "the very
existence of such restriction suggests that in its absence a competing article
of equal or better quality would be offered at the same or at a lower
52. Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 400 (1947).
53. Id. at 401.
54. Sinko Tool and Mfg. Co. v. Casco Products Corp., 89 F.2d 916 (7th Cir.
1937) ; see Tou.JLmN, HANDBOOK OF PATENTS 513 (1949).
55. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Hazeltine, 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
56. "To estop the licensee from attacking the validity of patents is to forget that
'It is the public interest that is dominant in the patent system.'" Id. at 839 (J. Doug-
las's dissent).
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price . . 57 The variety of royalty provisions available to the patentee
frequently provide him a more flexible and certain means of reward.
ROYALTY PROVISIONS IN PATENT LICENSES
The broad sweep of the Sherman Act and the statutes and decisions
implementing its policy does not interdict the supplier of raw material, parts
and services from charging as high a price as he anticipates will be con-
sistent with an optimum return. Entrepreneurs of bold faith in their own
judgment and capacities are not prohibited from applying their foresight
and nerve to predict and assume the risks involved in seeking greater pro-
duction and wider markets. The holder of a patent grant is in the position
of a sole supplier of a piece of technology. He can keep it for his own
use or non-use and exclude all others. But the more important and valu-
able the invention, the less likely it is that the patent holder will be
willing to undertake commercialization alone or exclude it from the mar-
ket. The patent holder can, of course, grant royalty-free licenses to all.
58
However, this requires a combination of extraordinary confidence, will
power and love of never-ending striving, lack of greed, and untapped mar-
kets, which seems to be highly atypical in the industrial community. The
usual patent holder wants immediate financial returns. Since price fixing
and restrictive provisions in licenses are being sharply attacked, he must
depend to a greater extent on royalties.
It has been repeatedly stated by the courts that "a patentee is free
Y"59in establishing a royalty on a patent to fix any base that it desires ...
For the royalty basis is said to be a matter for bargaining between the
parties, who may adapt it to their own convenience in accounting and busi-
ness operations. Unless qualified, however, this view is too broad, for there
is a public interest involved in the fixing of royalty bases, as in all matters
concerning patents.
Discrimination Among Licensees.-The patent holder's choice of a
royalty plan is limited by the requirement that it must not be used to obtain
a monopoly on unpatented goods. Thus the consideration exacted for the
use of the patent must be equal in every respect for those who purchase
unpatented material for use with the patented devise or process from the
patentee and those who buy from his competitors. Recovery was denied in
a suit for infringement of a patent on a process for demulsifying oil-water
mixtures where plaintiff licensed purchasers from plaintiff of fifty gallon
drums of an unpatented commercial product used in the process to use the
process royalty free with the contents of the drum, while offering unlimited
licenses to the public at a royalty of one cent for each 42-gallon barrel of
oil recovered plus an annual charge of $120 per well.60 Nor can a holder
57. VAUGHAN, ECONOMICS OF OUR PATENT SYSTEM 125-127 (1928).
58. "An insistent question is why not a return to the early ways of Henry Ford."
HAMILTON, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE, 121 (TNEC Monograph 31, 1941).
59. United States v. General Electric Co., et aL., 82 F. Supp. 753, 876 (D.NJ.,
1949).
60. Dehydrators Ltd. v. Petrolite Corp. Ltd., 117 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1941).
of a patent on a process for curing fresh concrete by coating it with an
unpatented bituminous emulsion to prevent evaporation include all royalty
charges for use of the process in the price of each gallon of unpatented emul-
sion purchased from it, but require u~ers of the process who purchased
emulsion elsewhere to pay royalty based on the number of square yards cov-
ered by the process. 6 ' The court pointed out that the latter royalty con-
trivance made the contractors' costs highly uncertain and unpredictable
since the area that could be covered with a given amount of emulsion varied
between five and eighteen square yards per gallon depending upon the tem-
perature and the skill of the workman. Thus contractors who purchased
the emulsion from the patentee would be able to spread it thinly and thus
reduce royalty costs, whereas the same course was not open to those who
purchased the unpatented emulsion from patentee's competitors. An even
clearer case is where a royalty is based upon any figure that increases di-
rectly as the prices of the patentee's competitors in the manufacture of un-
patented goods decrease. For example, a royalty based upon the difference
betwen the sales price of the patentee's unpatented product for use in the
patented process and the sales price of that product as sold on the open
market has been held illegal as tending to make users of the process pur-
chase the unpatented goods from the patentee.
6 2
Basing Royalties on Unpatented Products.-The patentee cannot base
his royalty solely upon the licensee's output of certain unpatented equip-
ment, so as to persuade the licensee not to manufacture that particular un-
patented equipment and thus increase sale of the patented product. That
such a power over the production of his licensee is not within the patent
holder's monopoly grant is demonstrated by Justice Reed's statement in
United States v. U.S. Gypsum:
"The provision in the license contracts that royalties should be
paid on the production of unpatented board is strongly indicative of an
agreement not to manufacture unpatented board, and the testimony of
the witnesses is ample to show that there was an understanding if not a
formal agreement, that only the patented board would be sold. Such
an arrangement in purpose and effect increases the area of the patent
monopoly and is invalid."
Royalty rates on unpatented manufactures of the licensee, graduated to
increase sharply as gross sales or production output exceeded certain quotas,
are also illegal. The Seventh Circuit held invalid such a license provision
in which the royalty was based upon the number of unpatented bricks turned
out by patented machinery because it was "obviously a price fixing, quan-
tity production agreement." 64
61. Barber Asphalt Corp. v. La Fera Grecco Contracting Co., 116 F.2d 211 (3d
Cir. 1940).
62. Dehydrators Ltd. v. Petrolite Corp. Ltd., 117 F.2d 183, 186 .(9th Cir. 1941).
63. 333 U.S. 364, 397 (1948).
64. American Equipment Co. v. Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., 69 F.2d 406, 409
(7th Cir. 1934).
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It has been held, however, in a series of district court cases and in a
recent Supreme Court Case that a license contract can call for royalties
founded upon a specified percentage of licensee's gross sales of unpatented
as well as patented products, or a percentage of the sales prices of a part
of the licensee's products, regardless of whether or not the patents are
utilized in the manufacture of the products. Mr. Justice Minton stated in
Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.65 that this type of
royalty provision was not per se a misuse of patents and that there was no
valid objection to the requirement that a minimum royalty of $10,000 a
year be paid even though the licensee does not make any use of the inven-
tions embodied in the licensor's patents. This was not considered an
extension of the patent monopoly but just another way of expressing a
variable consideration for use of the 700 odd patents, adopted for con-
venience of accounting and as harmless as would be a stipulation for a per-
centage of the net profits of the licensee's business. The non-exclusive
license upon which the patentee sued to recover royalties allowed the defend-
ant licensee to use any or all of some 700 patents, chiefly pertaining to radio
and television, in the manufacture of radios, television sets and phonographs
for "private noncommercial use." The Gypsum case was distinguished on
the absence of any purpose or effect to control licensee's production.
Various district court cases have upheld royalties based upon licensees'
output of unpatented solid carbon dioxide whether or not produced by the
processes and apparatus licensed under the patents; 16 the sale of unpatented
spectacle units embodying patented lenses; 67 the sale of all flat glass sten-
ciled by the patentee's process; 68 or on the quantity of material used or
work processed with the patentee's rust-proofing process.69
Thus, the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court up to now gen-
erally have approved the basing of royalties upon the licensee's sales as a
matter solely for bargaining between the parties. However, where royalty
provisions have been used to control production or prices, limitations have
been placed on the licensor's freedom to choose his own royalty base.
CONCLUSION
Obviously, the trend of court decisions is to place greater restrictions
on patentees' attempts to secure their reward. Certainly, it cannot be said
that the judiciary has so acted without cause. Rather, the burden of pro-
mulgating and enforcing such restrictions was forced upon it by the uncon-
scionable and selfish arrangements imposed by many patentees upon their
licensees. Competition was supressed; price fixing not only of patented
65. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827
(1950).
66. International Carbonic Engr. Co. v. Natural Carbonic Products, Inc., 57 F.
Supp. 248 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
67. American Optical Co. v. N.J. Optical Co., 58 F. Supp. 601 (D. Mass. 1944).
68. Ceramic Process Co. v. Cincinnati Adv. Prods. Co., 28 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.
Ohio 1939).
69. United States v. Parker Rust Proof Co., 61 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1945).
products but also of unpatented items was indulged in; and royalties which
had the effect of controlling the production of many items were thrust upon
manufacturers. Inevitably, serious conflicts developed between these prac-
tices and the free competition so fundamental to our economic system.
Courts have generally considered the latter interests as superior, and thus
today arrangements which incorporate mechanisms for price fixing, pro-
duction control, or the obtaining of a monopoly on non-patented goods are
severely frowned upon. Patentees are no longer able to dictate the prices
of non-patented products produced by their licensees, and their right to set
the price of patented products is under attack by a substantial minority of
the Supreme Court, led by Justice Douglas. Consequently, it should be
recognized that a three-fold risk is involved in the insertion of price-fixing
provisions in patent licenses--i.e., the risk of having to litigate the patent;
having relief in an infringement action or other litigation denied, and of
violating the anti-trust laws.
Broad royalty bases, however, are still available to the patentee, and if
properly used, adequate reward may be received and satisfactory protection
obtained from his licensee's competition. For example, royalties may be
based on either the patented or gross sales of licensees. The base used is said
to be a matter of accounting and business convenience to be bargained for
by the parties.. However, such agreements will be declared invalid if their
purpose or effect is to monopolize or control the production of unpatented
products. Thus quota restriction and discriminatory royalties have not
been allowed, and it is most probable that the court's attention and severe
scrutiny will be continually directed at royalty arrangements based on a
licensee's total production. For this area may still provide a fertile terri-
tory for patentees to use their superior bargaining position in order to
reap rewards exceeding those contemplated in the patent statutes.
The challenge therefore is clear. Patentees, if they wish to avoid being
subjected to increased government restrictions, must harmonize their de-
sires with the basic tenants of our economic system. The monopoly granted
them is "to promote the progress of science and useful arts." It must not
be abused.
David L. Farley, Jr.*
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